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1Efficient Security Algorithm for Power Constrained
IoT Devices
Joseph N. Mamvong, Gokop L. Goteng, Bo Zhou, Yue Gao, Senior member, IEEE
Abstract—Internet of Things (IoT) devices characterized by low
power and low processing capabilities do not exactly fit into the
provision of existing security techniques, due to their constrained
nature. Classical security algorithms which are built on complex
cryptographic functions often require a level of processing that
low power IoT devices are incapable to effectively achieve due
to limited power and processing resources. Consequently, the
option for constrained IoT devices lies in either developing new
security schemes or modifying existing ones to be more suitable
for constrained IoT devices. In this work, an Efficient security
Algorithm for Constrained IoT devices; based on the Advanced
Encryption Standard is proposed. We present a cryptanalytic
overview of the consequence of complexity reduction together
with a supporting mathematical justification, and provisioned a
secure element (ATECC608A) as a trade-off. The ATECC608A
doubles for authentication and guarding against implementation
attacks on the associated IoT device (ARM Cortex M4 micro-
processor) in line with our analysis. The software implementation
of the efficient algorithm for constrained IoT devices shows up
to 35% reduction in the time it takes to complete the encryption
of a single block (16bytes) of plain text, in comparison to the
currently used standard AES-128 algorithm, and in comparison
to current results in literature at 26.6%
Index terms— Encryption, Complexity, Security Algo-
rithms, Internet of Things (IoT) Security, Constrained IoT
Devices.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the recent past, there has been a gradual shift of the
IoT technology discuss from being highly theoretical to a
realistic actualization. IoT devices have been estimated in
several scholarly articles to be in the range of twenty to
fifty billion devices by the year 2025 [1], [2]. The projection
of the Internet of Things (IoT) technology is to give every
real object a virtual reality, bringing about an unprecedented
connectivity of things more than ever before. In the years
ahead, the Internet of Things will have major impact on
business models [3]–[7], agriculture [8], [9], transportation
[10]–[12], automated industrial processes [13]–[15], homes
[16], [17], infrastructure, security, trade standards, and much
more. However, as interesting and promising as the projection
of the complete actualization of the IoT technology sounds, this
advancement is going to be closely accompanied by myriads
of challenges -including security. Such extreme interconnection
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will bring unprecedented convenience and economy, but it will
also require novel approaches to ensure its safe and ethical
use [18]. In [19], while acknowledging the emergence of the
IoT in redefining convenience in the lives and education of
children through emerging applications on mobile phones, it
was identified that these apps also make illegal and inappro-
priate contents such as pornography, violence and drugs -to
mention a few, become more accessible to children and thus,
negatively impacting the growth of minors. They proposed
a novel automatic content detection framework for detecting
inappropriate content in effort to solve this problem. In [20],
an attack tolerance scheme to cooperate with existing defence
mechanism is proffered for enabling self-recovery ability for
the vehicular edge networks sub-domain, of the Industrial
Internet of Things (IIoT). In [21], an analysis of the security
challenges for Internet of Things (IoT) according to the various
layers of the IoT architecture was presented. Some of these
challenges include node reputation, information interception,
access control, terminal security, privacy, heterogeneous tech-
nology and network security to mention but a few.
A. Motivation
Securing the Internet of Things (IoT) is a necessary mile-
stone towards expediting the deployment of its applications
and services [22]. According to [23], As smart home systems
get more and more popular recently, the security protection
of smart home systems has become an important problem.
Architecting IoT focused security solutions must however, take
into considerations the unique circumstance of power con-
strained IoT devices as according to [24], reaping the benefits
of the Internet of Things (IoT) is contingent upon developing
IoT-specific security and privacy solutions. According to [25],
Since IoT communication protocols and technologies differ
from traditional IT realms, their security solutions ought to
take this difference into account. Security of conventional IT
infrastructure is achieved using classical cryptographic proto-
cols and algorithms whereas, applying classical cryptographic
methods for IoT security is not efficient as those methods
were not ideally designed for these kind of systems [21].
Consequently, the option for IoT in terms of security lies either
in the development of new schemes or the modification of
existing ones.
B. Contributions
Motivated by the aforementioned works which summarize
the unsuitability of the usage of conventional cryptographic
algorithms for security in the IoT landscape, We propose an
2efficient security algorithm for power constrained IoT devices
which aimed to reduce complexity of the currently used
security algorithm: The Advanced Encryption Standard, in the
IoT landscape. The major contributions of this paper are thus
summarized as follows:
• We present a cryptanalytic overview and analysis of the
consequences of reducing the complexity of the AES,
which is the currently used encryption algorithm in the
IoT landscape.
• We present a mathematical justification of reducing the
complexity of the standard AES-128 algorithm, using
the core algebraic properties of the standard algorithm.
This is followed by provisioning a secure element: the
ATECC608A to aid authentication and guard against
implementation attacks in line with our analysis of the
consequence of round reduction of the AES-128.
• We implemented a safely reduced round versions (four
rounds and two rounds) of the AES-128 algorithm, based
on the the structure of the AES in order to reduce
complexity (measured by the time it takes to complete
the encryption of 16bytes of plain text).
• We compared the reduced round algorithm and the stan-
dard AES-algorithm. Our results show that up to 35% of
the time it takes to complete the encryption of a single
byte of plain-text is saved.
With respect to the categories of security challenges in the 
IoT and cyber-physical systems landscape as outlined in 
[21], our work aims to address the bit of privacy and access 
control, through message encryption and secure authentication 
respectively, and also to guard against implementation attacks 
on the associated IoT device. The remaining of this paper 
is organized as follows: Section II contains the background 
information and mechanism that was used in complexity 
reduction aimed at constrained IoT devices. In section III, 
we present a cryptanalytic analysis of the consequence of 
complexity reduction together with a detailed mathematical 
justification for doing such, and then the efficient algorithm 
for constrained IoT devices. In section IV, we present 
an implementation evaluation wherein we discussed the 
experimental setup, computation complexity, results and 
summary of our implementation. Section V covers related 
work on the notion of complexity in terms of key sources 
and cipher in line with the IoT narrative. A discussion section 
highlighting some IoT applications, the plausibility of the 
developed solution and future works is presented in section 
VI and an appendix section showing the detailed proves of 
theorems used in the work is presented in VII
II. BACKGROUND OF COMPLEXITY REDUCTION AIMED AT
CONSTRAINED IOT DEVICES
According to [26], IoT devices are known for their
limited memory space and computational capabilities, and 
conventional solutions such as encryption methods are 
inadequate to solve many privacy concerns. According to 
[27], the running time of the algorithm imposes a constraint 
on its applicability in several domain. In favor of the narrative 
of constrained IoT devices, they proposed that an extension
of DES into Galois fields of GF (16) with a 256-bits key 
might be a good alternative to the advanced encryption 
standard if the technology is sufficiently developed to run fast 
enough. In [28], A low power algorithm aimed at improving 
on the power consumption by classical algorithms for IoT 
was proposed. Observing that the power cost of transmission 
and reception of data typically outweighs the cost of the 
cryptographic algorithms themselves, they proposed a method 
called Authenticated Encryption with Replay protection 
(AERO), which shows to significantly reduce overheads even 
when used in higher-layer protocols above the link layer. This 
work suggests that the cost of transmission and reception of 
messages could be reduced by up to 30%, which translates 
into improving the limited resource of power in constrained 
IoT devices, although [29] observed that significant power can 
be saved by this method but the security of the method needs 
to be confirmed. The authors in [30] proposed a lightweight 
enhanced Distributed Low-rate Attack Mitigating (eDLAM) 
mechanism in tandem with the constrained resource narrative 
of IoT devices, which aims to mitigate DDoS attacks and 
obtain maximum utility in IoT deployments
In [29], an AES-128 based Secure Low Power Communication 
(SeLPC) algorithm for LoRaWAN IoT environment, which 
details in two phases namely: the key generation phase and 
data encryption phase was proposed. The algorithm aimed 
at significantly improving on AES to meet low powered 
devices security constrains, detailing that in the standard 
AES encryption process, the SubBytes stage typically looks 
up S-Box to encrypt and decrypt data stream but as the 
contents of the S-Box in AES are fixed, this greatly reduces 
its security level since the only nonlinear component of this 
block ciphering technique is the manipulation on S-Box. 
To enhance AES’s cryptographic strength, an encryption 
key that generates the corresponding dynamic box (D-Box) 
to substitute for the primary substitution box(S-Box) was 
derived. Following this, the simplified standard AES-128 
encryption process of 10 cycles down to 5 cycles with the aim 
to reduce computational complexity and save power consumed 
by end devices in a LoRaWAN IoT environment, although 
the reason or rationale for simplifying to specifically 5 
rounds was not stated. However, the SelPC algorithms utilizes 
an Enhanced Dynamic Accumulated Shifting Substitution 
(EDASS) algorithm which leverages high input sensitivity 
and randomness to harden the security of the D-Box against 
attacks. According to [29], if a hacker would like to decrypt 
an application- layer message, the attacker needs to know the 
128-bit AppSKey and D-Box. As n-bit security is defined 
by 2n; where n = number of bits, the possibility of the 
AppSKey and D-Box combination multiplies to 2128 × 256!
and thus, enhancing the security of the standard AES-128 
algorithm with the default n-bit security of 2128 bits. Results 
of their method shows that the SeLPC algorithm can save 
26.2% of power consumption in comparison to the traditional 
security algorithm based on the standard AES algorithm in a 
LoRaWAN environment and thus, improving the security of 
constrained IoT devices.
3III. THE PROPOSED SECURITY ALGORITHM FOR POWER
CONSTRAINED IOT DEVICES
The security algorithm for power constrained IoT devices
aims to reduce the complexity of the AES which is currently
the widely used security algorithm for LPWA networks based
on our investigation in section II A above. The AES-128
variant of the algorithm is considered for this exercise. The
natural question that arises however is of what the conse-
quence of this reduction might be. Our approach takes directly
in providing a cryptanalytic overview of the consequence
of complexity reduction and its corresponding mathematical
justification, following which we provision a secure element,
the ATECC608A for aiding authentication and hardening the
security of the associated IoT device in the perspective of the
consequence from our analysis.
A. Cryptanalytic Overview of the Consequence of AES Round
Reduction
Here, we present an overview of the consequence of re-
ducing the rounds of the AES algorithm from a cryptanalytic
standpoint. We make the point that the major consequence of
this exercise is with respect to implementation attacks; and
this is precisely the perspective in which we have provisioned
a compensation with the secure element as a trade-off in the
efficient security algorithm for power constrained IoT devices.
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Fig. 1. Cryptanalytic overview of the consequence of AES round reduction.
While a formal analysis of security protocols is on its own,
an whole area of fertile research [31], according to [32],
the security of an encryption scheme is usually measured
through the application of different types of cryptanalysis
methods. The security of the AES algorithm with respect to
key length is based on its resistance against breakability by
brute-force/exhaustive key search. This is usually expressed
in bits, where n-bits security means that the attacker would
have to perform 2n operations to break it. In the standard
AES-128 algorithm, this is equals 2128 operations, for which
there are no computing resources currently available. In this
context of exhaustive key-search attack, the reduction of the
number of rounds while retaining the key length of 128bits
means that the security level is still preserved. The security
structure of the algorithm against the analytical family of
attacks is based on the Galois field properties which operations
render the S-Boxes. We rationalized the preservation of this
structure of the algorithm using the core algebraic properties
of the algorithm. The details of this rationalization are in the
section III-B. Implementation attacks however is a family of
attacks that try to achieve what cannot be achieved through
Brute-force attacks and analytical attacks, by attempting to
manipulate the encryption algorithm at the point of hardware
implementation. This is mainly characterized by measuring the
electrical power consumption of a processor which operates
on the key [33], [34], and the power trace can then be used
to recover the key by applying signal processing techniques.
In the efficient security algorithm for power constrained IoT
devices, the trade-off for the round reduction is the introduction
of a secure element: which doubles for authentication of the
associated IoT device and to guard against implementation
attacks, thereby sufficiently ensuring security covering: brute-
force, analytical and implementation attacks and leaving social
engineering attacks which can be managed by policies as
shown in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2. Cryptanalytic overview of the efficient security algorithm for power
constrained IoT devices.
B. Justifying Round Reduction and Security Trade-off
The following presents the mathematical details of the
justification for reducing the rounds of the AES algorithm.
We rationalized that the security structures with respect to
brute-force and analytical attacks is preserved based on the
underlying algebraic properties of the cipher.
Firstly, round reduction does not impact on the key length
of the cipher and since n-bit security is defined by 2n; where
n = number of bits then
⇒ 2128 = 2128
Thus, we have that the cipher’s properties which guarantee
defense against brute-force attacks is preserved. Next, we want
show that the Galois Fields properties of the cipher that guards
against analytical attacks are preserved. It suffices to show that
the algebraic structure which renders elements of the S-box
tables is undefiled by round reduction.
TABLE I
TABLE OF IMPORTANT SYMBOLS
Notation Meaning
Nbr Number of rounds executed by the round function
F Field (as an algebraic structure)
n An arbitrary natural number
GF Galois Field
Deg degree of a polynomial elements in the Galois Field
P An arbitrary prime number
Mod Modulo: the operation or function that returns the
remainder of one number divided by another
Zp Ring of integers modulo p
n(x), m(x),
α(x),β(x)
Arbitrary polynomial elements of the Galois Field
GF (Pn)
O The ”big oh” notation
Let n and m be some arbitrary bytes of an AES mes-
sage block. As n and m are bytes of an AES message,
it implies that n and m are elements of the Galois Field
F = GF (28) = GF (Pn). Since the elements of a Galois Field
4F are non-numerical: precisely polynomials with the element
representation:
A(x) = xm−1 + ...+ a1x+ a0
for any arbitrary A(x) ∈ F = GF (pn), n = n(x) =
an−1xn−1+ ...+a1x+a0. For the additive operator, given two
arbitrary polynomials n and m in F , the sum n(x) + m(x) is
defined by
z(x) = n(x) +m(x) =
m−1∑
i=1
zix
i where zi = ni +mi mod2
. Elements inversion with this operation naturally gives rise to
subtraction defined by =
z(x) = n(x)−m(x) =
m−1∑
i=1
zix
i where zi = ni −mi mod2
To show the field properties of element combination and
inversion with respect to the multiplicative operator, we
consider the following theorems:
Theorem 1: Let F be a field and let n(x), m(x) be
polynomial elements in F , where m(x) = 0, then there exist
unique polynomials (x) and r(x) in F such that;
n(x) = m(x)(x) + r(x) (1)
where either r = 0 or deg(r(x)) < deg(m(x))
Theorem 2: Let F be a field, and n(x) and m(x) be non-
zero polynomials in F , then n(x) and m(x) have a unique
monic greatest common divisor, say d(x) in F such that:
d(x) = α(x)n(x) + β(x)m(x) (2)
Theorem 3: Let F = GF (28) = GF (Pn) be a field,
then there exists an irreducible polynomial of degree n over Zp
As F is a field, we have that for the arbitrary elements
n(x),m(x) and z(x) ∈ F = GF (Pn), n(x) + m(x) =
(an−1xn−1+ ...+ a1x+ a0) + (am−1xm−1+ ...+ a1x+ a0),
z(x) = n(x) + m(x) =
∑m−1
i=1 zix
i,where i = ni +
mimod2 ∈ F = GF (28) =GF (Pn).
Also, by the application of Theorem 1 and Theorem 3 above
we have that n(x) × m(x) = [(an−1xn−1 + ... + a1x + a0)
×(am−1xm−1 + ... + a1x + a0)] modx8 + x4 + x3 + x +
1 = z(x) ∈ F = GF (28) = GF (Pn) and so, clo-
sure; with respect to the additive and multiplicative operators
hold in F . Associativity also holds in F by a combina-
tion of the same theorems with the arbitrary elements on:
(an−1xn−1 + ... + a1x + a0) + [(am−1xm−1 + ... + a1x +
a0)+(az−1xz−1+ ...+a1x+a0)] = [(an−1xn−1+ ...+a1x+
a0)+(am−1xm−1+...+a1x+a0)]+(az−1xz−1+...+a1x+a0)
and (an−1xn−1+ ...+ a1x+ a0)× [(am−1xm−1+ ...+ a1x+
a0)×(az−1xz−1+ ...+a1x+a0)] = [(an−1xn−1+ ...+a1x+
a0)×(am−1xm−1+...+a1x+a0)]×(az−1xz−1+...+a1x+a0)
for the additive and multiplicative operators respectively. Sim-
ilarly, n(x) + (−(n(x)) = (an−1xn−1 + ... + a1x + a0) +
(−(an−1xn−1 + ...+ a1x+ a0)) = 0,
n(x) × (n(x)−1) = [(an−1xn−1 + ... + a1x + a0) ×
(n(x)−1)] modx8 + x4 + x3 + x + 1 = 1 and the identity
elements and inverses exist for the additive and multiplicative
operators in F accordingly. Distributivity also holds in F
accordingly and so, satisfying the properties of an additive
group and a multiplicative group in F . By Theorem 2, the
existence of a greatest common divisor between the arbitrary
bytes of the AES message blocks: n(x) and m(x) is guaran-
teed. Division, which implies element inversion with respect
to the multiplicative operator is also guaranteed in GF (28) by
Theorem 1 and by Theorem 3, the existence of an irreducible
polynomial over the message field GF (28) is guaranteed.
Moreover, the irreducible polynomial: x8+x4+x3+x+1 is a
part of the AES specification and so, the operations of addition
and multiplication, together with their corresponding inversions
are guaranteed given the arbitrary AES message bytes n,m and
z ∈ F = GF (Pn). Therefore, the underlying structures of the
cipher that renders the entries of the AES S-boxes hold and
thus, the core security attributes of algorithm in the context of
analytical attacks is preserved with respect to round reduction.
C. The efficient algorithm for power constrained IoT devices:
The efficient security algorithm executes a two-step process
for an associated power constrained IoT device as follows:
1) Secure authentication using the ATECC608A
2) Message encryption using the reduced round cipher
Leveraging the tamper-proof secure element for secure au-
thentication, the reduced round algorithm executes the round
function in four iterations using a total of 80bytes scheduled
key as against the 176bytes of the standard AES, for every
block of the plaintext, following the process of key-whitening,
initialization and the execution of the round function. The
pseudo code of the process flow of the proposed algorithm
is presented in Table II.
TABLE II
THE ALGORITHM FLOW
The Efficient Security Algorithm for Constrained IoT Devices
Step1
* Initializing the IoT device and the ATECC608 secure element
* Invoking authentication using ATECC608 and generating
tamper-proof security keys
Step2
1. Input: message, key
2. Nbr selection: 2 or 4 and initialization of the Nbr counter
3. Expand key to length: (block size) *Nbr + block size
4. STATE = message XORed with Key (Key whitening)
5. Invoke the round function: While counter is less than the
selected Nbr:
i. STATE = SubByte(STATE)
ii. STATE = ShiftRows(STATE)
iii. If counter < selected nbr:
1. STATE = MixColumn(STATE)
iv. Invoke addRoundKey(STATE,NextRoundkey)
6. Output STATE as resulting Ciphertext
The secure element (SE): ATECC608A-MAHTN-T is a
microprocessor which can store sensitive data and run secure
applications. Developed by the ARM in collaboration with
LoRaWAN and the Things industry, it holds the potential to au-
tomatically offload all cryptographic operations, such that keys
will never be visible nor accessible, even when the associated
IoT device might be compromised [35]. The ARM Cortex M4
is a microprocessor designed for low energy efficient devices.
With both processors Run by the Mbed operating system (OS),
5they support IoT application development via the Mbed Inte-
grated Development Platform and supports the IEEE 802.15.4
specification and lower power communications protocols in-
cluding: Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), Zigbee, Low Power
Wide Area Network (LoRaWAN), Routing Protocol for Low
power devices (RPL), Constrained application protocol (CoAP)
and the Message Queueing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) mes-
saging protocol for constrained IoT devices and support the
LoRaWAN 1.x and 1.1. The ATECC608A functionality to
wades against implementation attacks which aim to exploit the
recovery of encryption keys through manipulating the efficient
security algorithm for power constrained IoT device at the
point of hardware implementation. This serves as compensa-
tion for the reduced round and consolidating the preserved
security properties of the algorithm in the perspective of brute-
force and analytical attacks as discussed in section III-A. More-
over, the ATECC608A-MAHTN-T microchip offers a secure
authentication of the associated IoT device onto the network
infrastructure; a requirement that precedes the functionality
of secure message encryption and decryption hence, enabling
the two-step process of the efficient security algorithm for
power constrained IoT with functionality summarized against
the IEEE 802.15.4 architecture as shown in Fig. 3.
Application
Transmisson
Perception
ARM CORTEX M4
ATECC608-MAHTN-T
Mbed 
OS
PROJECT / IoT DEVICEFUNCTIONALITY
ARCHITECTURE
Secure
Authentication
Message
 Encryption / Decryption
Following Secure
Authentication
Fig. 3. Algorithm Functionality in the IEEE 802.15.4 architecture
IV. IMPLEMENTATION EVALUATION
In this section, we present a summary of our experimentation
setup for implementation, computational complexity of the pro-
posed algorithm and finally, the results of our experimentation
and a comparative analysis of the proposed efficient algorithm
for low power IoT devices with respect to the standard AES.
A. Experimental setup
Our experimentation tools include the Zerynth studio which
runs python optimized with C, and Jupyter notebook for the
software implementation, analysis and plots respectively. For
each instance of encryption, the encryption is repeated for
one thousand iterations and the average execution time of
the one thousand iterations is logged as the execution time
for that instance. The notion of average is here employed
to obtain statistically relevant values and easily identify and
handle outliers for the various encryption instances and this
was done for the reduced round algorithm and all the key
lengths of the standard AES algorithm as detailed in the Tables
III and IV.
B. Results and Analysis of Computation Complexity of the
Efficient Algorithm for Constrained IoT Devices
The measure of an algorithm’s complexity is popularly
using the big O notation, which essentially is a mathematical
notation that describes the limiting behavior of a function when
the argument tends to a value or infinity [36]. According to
[37], this is frequently used in the analysis of algorithms to
describe an algorithm’s usage of computational resources: the
worst case or average case running time or memory usage of
an algorithm is often expressed as a function of the length
of its input. The input sized of the proposed algorithm for
constrained IoT devices is a fixed 16bytes block size of input,
and thus of O(1) computational complexity in terms of the
big O notation with respect to the input size and O(m), with
a growing message size m, as there would be m blocks to
encrypt. As reviewed in section V, the running time of an
encryption algorithm ultimately impacts on the power and
processing resources of the constrained IoT devices . In line
with this reality, we present an analysis of the computation
complexity of the proposed algorithm which we measured
by the execution time-difference between the standard AES
and variants of the proposed algorithm for constrained IoT
devices. While the AES-128 is 10.5% and 16.1% cheaper
than the AES-192 and AES-256 respectively in encrypting a
single block (sixteen bytes) of plain text on a one thousand
average; the proposed algorithm is 27.1% and 35% cheaper
than the standard AES-128 for the rr2 and rr4 implementations
respectively. This is further detailed in the results and analysis
below:
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6Our results show that the proposed efficient low power
algorithm for constrained IoT devices in comparison is 27.1%
cheaper than the standard AES128 (in the case of reducing to
four rounds -rr4) and 35% cheaper than the AES-128 (in the
case of reducing to two rounds -rr2) in favor of the narrative
of the constrained IoT devices. This is shown in Fig. 5
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The degree of complexity reduction measured by the com-
plexity difference between the AES-128 and proposed algo-
rithm for low power constrained IoT devices is obtained to be
higher than the complexity difference between the AES-256
and the AES-128 by 11.57%:
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Tables III and IV show the head and tail respectively, of 
the data generated from our experimentation of the measure
of complexities of the standard AES key lengths and those of
the reduced round algorithm, and from which figures 4, 5 
and 6 were plotted.
TABLE III
HEAD (FIRST 5 ROWS) OF GENERATED DATA OF ENCRYPTION 
TIMES OF THE KEY LENGTHS CONSIDERED
Instances AES-
128
(Sec)
AES-
192
(Sec)
AES-
256
(Sec)
rr4(Sec) rr2(Sec)
1 0.7964807 1.063512 1.150296 0.35891 0.31994
2 0.9380837 1.087956 1.231360 0.33022 0.35540
3 0.6789956 0.958238 1.091734 0.77476 0.26462
4 0.8400028 0.779829 0.862398 0.28851 0.25722
5 0.6990071 0.820398 1.179501 0.32904 0.24158
TABLE IV
TAIL (LAST 5 ROWS) OF GENERATED DATA OF ENCRYPTION
TIMES OF THE KEY LENGTHS CONSIDERED
Instances AES-
128
(Sec)
AES-
192
(Sec)
AES-
256
(Sec)
rr4(Sec) rr2(Sec)
96 0.652252 0.759551 0.787011 0.29394 0.30342
97 0.649166 0.717744 0.787098 0.29911 0.20491
98 0.673988 0.741114 0.840172 0.28418 0.20308
99 0.677502 0.825463 0.813646 0.29465 0.19018
100 0.649555 0.745380 0.797678 0.30057 0.20931
We carried out a covariances analysis of the various key
lengths from the data generated from our experimentation. This
was done through the computation of the covariance matrixes
of pairs of key lengths to buttress the notion of growing
complexities associated with the key lengths as discussed in
section V. This is demonstrated by the result of positive
covariance values as shown in table V and this is further
consolidated by the reduced algorithm being 27.7% and 35%
cheaper than the standard AES as shown in Fig. 5. A table of
the comparisons of covariances is shown below:
TABLE V
COVARIANCES COMPARISON OF THE REDUCED ROUND
ALGORITHM THE STANDARD AES KEY LENGTHS
Cov(AES-
128,
AES-192)
Cov(AES-
192,
AES256)
Cov(AES-
128
AES256)
Cov(rr4-
AES128,
AES128)
Cov(rr2-
AES128,
rr4-AES128)
0.00202746 0.0033184 0.00202 0.00065489 0.00055592
V. RELATED WORK
A. Constrained IoT Devices and Security Algorithms
Effectively implementing conventional security mechanisms
in the IoT domain is challenging as most of state-of-the-art
mechanisms are too heavy to suit for the tiny and resource
constrained IoT devices [38]. Leading classical security
algorithms which have been widely used for encrypting
messages include; but not limited to the Data Encryption
Standard (DES) [33], [39], [40], the Triple Data Encryption
Standard (3DES) [27], [41], and the Advanced Encryption
7Standard (AES) [33], [39], [42]–[44]. On the security
standing of these classical algorithms and their viability
in the rapidly developing IoT landscape, while DES has
been widely accepted as insecure and although the security
of the 3DES is being adjudged to be reasonably secure
[40] in certain applications, the properties of 3DES when
juxtaposed with the characteristics of constrained IoT
devices shows no viability as according to [41], the triple
encryption/decryption in comparison to standard DES triples
the cost of required resources and latency as a corresponding
consequence, resulting in the 3DES being slower than other
cipher algorithms [45] [31]. These properties when juxtaposed
with the constrained properties of IoT devices in addition
to the inherent drawbacks of the standard DES algorithm
makes the triple DES still a very expensive option for
the IoT landscape. According to [27], the running time of
the algorithm imposes a constraint on its applicability in
several domain. They proposed that an extension of DES
into Galois fields of GF (16) with a 256-bits key might
be a good alternative to the AES if the technology is
sufficiently developed to run fast enough. Encryption refers
to the processes of transforming an original message called
plaintext into a secret form called ciphertext, using a key
called an encryption key, such that only authorized parties
can access the message and those who are not authorized
cannot. Decryption refers to the reverse process of inverting
a ciphertext back to plaintext using a corresponding secret key.
In [46], a survey of the technical specifications of leading
Low Power Wide Area (LPWA) technologies including the
Long Range Wide Area Network (LoRaWAN) and INGENU
(formally known as On-Ramp wireless) is presented. INGENU
is a competing standard to the LoRaWAN in the rolling out of
LPWA technologies. The survey shows that the AES is cur-
rently the adopted algorithm for authentication and encryption
and thus, crowning the AES as the algorithm currently being
widely used for communication security in constrained IoT
devices.
However, According to [21], applying these classical cryp-
tographic methods for IoT security is not efficient as those
methods were not ideally designed for these kind of systems.
They advocated for hybrid light weight models for improving
security situation in IoT. Thus, the need for investigating what
components of the existing algorithms make them expensive
and explore how they can be improved. According to [47], It
will be of particularly importance to explore new techniques
of jointly defending against multiple types of wireless attacks,
which may be termed as mixed wireless attacks. Tradition-
ally, the protocol layers have been protected separately to
meet their individual communications security requirements.
However, these traditional layered security mechanisms are
potentially inefficient, since each protocol layer introduces
additional computational complexity and latency. As a result,
the need of addressing security challenges in more than one
layer of the IoT protocol architecture is also advocated. In
[47], it was said the classic Diffie–Hellman key agreement
protocol is traditionally used to achieve the key exchange
between the source and destination and requires a trusted
key management centre. The complexity of these security
algorithms with respect to the constrained nature of the IoT
devices can be broadly considered in two perspectives viz:
the method through which encryption keys are obtained and
the cypher itself. Fig. 1 shows a rather compressed summary
of these various methods of obtaining the encryption keys
by these algorithms, of which each of these methods hold
its own inherent notion of complexity when juxtaposed with
the constrained nature of IoT devices such as limited power
resource and processing capabilities.
On a broad category, sources of encryption keys being used
by these classical algorithms can be classified into three as
summarized in Fig. 7 viz: Centralized key generation and
management systems [21], [48], [49], Public Key Cryptogra-
phy key generation methods [24], [33], [39], [44], [48] and
most recently, the exploration of Channel State Information
(CSI) key generation methods [47], [48], [50]–[53]. For each
of the above-listed method of encryption key generation being
used with these classical algorithms, there is the associated
challenges with respect to complexity and the constrained
nature of IoT devices. According to [21], key management
which includes generating, distributing, storing and destroying
the secret key is identified as a security challenge in wireless
sensor networks, a category within the lager body of the
Internet of things (IoT) [24], [49]. According to [49], due
to resource constraints, key agreement in IoT is non-trivial.
Many key agreement schemes used in general networks, such
as Kerberos and RSA, may not be suitable for IoT because
there is usually no trusted infrastructure in IoT. Pre-distribution
of secret keys for all pairs of nodes is not viable due to
the large amount of memory used when the network size
is large. According to [48], this approach of encryption key
generation have been long regarded as expensive in terms
of computational complexity. According to [22], securing the
IoT devices has become challenging due to the simplicity,
resource-constrained nature and low storage capabilities of IoT
devices at the perception layer. In [54], a True Random Number
Generator using Random Telegraph Noise (RTN) was proposed
to address speed, design area, power and cost as constrained
resources in low power devices, thereby making a plausible
candidate for cryptographically secure IoT applications. The
notion of complexity on the part of the cipher however depends
on factors such as the design and structure of the cipher.
However, According to [24], complex security techniques such
as classical cryptographic protocols cannot be easily imple-
mented on IoT devices due to the memory and computational
resources required in deploying such algorithms. Hence, the
option for constrained IoT devices lies in either developing
new security schemes or modifying existing security schemes
towards reducing complexity of these classical algorithms
aimed at constrained IoT devices.
B. The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and The Reduced
Round Algorithm
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a block cipher
cryptographic algorithm defined by the National Institute of
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Fig. 7. Encryption Key generation sources
Standards and Technology (NIST) in 2001, following the
concern of the insecurity that plagued the DES and 3DES
algorithms and calls for new algorithms to be standardized
[29], [33]. Based on Rijndael cipher, it encrypts messages in
blocks of 128bits and supports three distinct key lengths of
128, 192 and 256bits with corresponding cipher rounds of
ten, twelve and fourteen respectively. The process of AES
encryption is described as follows:
1) State/Initialization (Key Whitening)
The result of the State/initial round which is also known
as the key whitening stage is basically having the message
bits XORed with the key bits: Message (16bytes) XORed
Key(16bytes)
2) The Round Function
SubBytes: This stage involves a non-linear, invertible trans-
formation whereby each of the bytes in the message block is
replaced by another byte. These substitutions usually follow
the presentation of the Rijndael S-box look up table.
The ShiftRows Stage: The ShiftRows operation is done on
the result of the STATE produced after the SubBytes operation.
Visualizing the result as a matrix, the ShiftRow is an element-
wise rotational operation with elements of the first Row being
shifted by zero to the left (or not being shifted at all), the
second row being shifted by one element, the third element
shifted by two elements and so on until the last Row is shifted.
The MixColumns Stage: The MixColumn operation is done
on the STATE, having undergone the shiftRow operation. The
operations involve multiplying each column of the data block
with a modular polynomial in the Galois Field GF (28).
Add Round Key Stage: During the key expansion, the original
key is used to generate round keys that are used in the rounds.
This means the key in each round is different, although all 
generated from the same key during key schedule. In the add 
round key stage, the STATE bytes from the MixColumn stage 
are XORed with the bytes of the sub-key for that round. 
Depending on the key length which determines the number 
of rounds, each round of the AES encryption process except 
for the last round; performs the process of the round function 
above. The last round ends with the MixColumns stage and 
outputs the ciphertext.
In comparison to the standard AES-128 algorithm which 
repeats the round function described above for 10 iterations 
and uses a total length of one hundred and seventy six bytes 
(176B) scheduled key, the proposed reduced round algorithm 
executes the round function in four iterations using a total 
of 80bytes scheduled key as against the 176bytes of the 
standard AES. In addition, a tamper-proof secure element 
(ATECC608A) which guarantees secure authentication for the 
associated IoT device is first p rovisioned p rior t o message 
encryption using the proposed reduced round algorithm.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
A. Discussion
The proposed solution can be applied in IoT deployment 
scenarios with devices requiring low cost encryption solu-
tion due to constrained resources. Some of the challenges 
accompanied by the advent of cloud computing being a key 
enabler for the provisioning of IoT devices is the need for 
encrypting IoT device data before outsourcing it to the cloud, 
despite the inherent constraints of most IoT devices in terms of 
processing capabilities. According to [55], encryption-before-
outsourcing is a widely recommended method to guarantee 
the confidentiality of user data in the IoT domain, whereas the
9need of architecting these devices with client-side encryption 
capabilities in order to preserve the privacy of data generated 
and outsourced to cloud storage systems brings on another 
layer of burden on the devices, given the scarcity of resources. 
In order to protect the security of the outsourced data, an 
intuitive way is to encrypt the data before outsourcing it to 
the cloud [56] and according to [57], the integration of IoT 
devices and cloud servers is highly dependent on how security 
issues such as authentication and data privacy are handled. 
Thus, provisioning these IoT devices with low-cost encryption 
algorithms and without compromise to secure provisioning is 
advocated. The efficient security algorithm for constrained IoT 
devices would be useful in aiding such low cost client side 
encryption and secure provisioning of these devices to the 
cloud. On another front, resources sharing mechanism in the 
IoT domain where resource constrained IoT devices can offload 
computationally intensive resources to resource-rich ones in 
order to achieve high quality of experience is encouraged in 
[15]. Accordingly, more complex scenarios of the use case 
of the proposed power efficient algorithm can be explored 
to leverage these efforts, and use the algorithm for resource 
constrained devices while adapting to the standard algorithm 
for the resource rich scenarios. Hinging on the discussed 
challenges, the following plausible directions for future work 
is derived:
• Utilization of the efficient security algorithm for con-
strained IoT devices for a low cost client-side encryption 
and secure provisioning of constrained IoT devices onto 
the cloud.
• leveraging the efficient security algorithm for constrained 
IoT devices in dynamic resource sharing environments 
where computationally intensive tasks are off-loaded to 
the resource-rich ones for assisted processing, and com-
pare the efficiency of the two methods.
• leveraging the method in [54] for a low power high 
speed True Random Number Generator (TRNG) using 
random telegraph noise to source for low power IoT-
friendly encryption keys generation, in combination with 
the proposed solution to enhance client-side authentica-
tion, encryption and provisioning of an IoT device onto a 
cloud infrastructure.
B. Conclusion
We proposed an Efficient Security algorithm for Power
Constrained IoT devices which aimed to reduce complex-
ity of the currently used security algorithm: The Advanced
Encryption Standard, in the IoT landscape. We showed a
cryptanalytic overview and the associated consequence of such
complexity reduction, together with a mathematical justifica-
tion that the core algebraic properties of the algorithm are pre-
served, following which we provisioned a secure element: The
ATECC608A for aiding authentication and guarding against
implementation attacks in line with our analysis.
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VII. APPENDIX
This section holds more detailed proves of the theorems used
in this paper.
Theorem 1: Let F be a field and let n(x), m(x) be polynomial
elements in F , where m(x = 0), then there exist unique
polynomials (x) and r(x) in F such that;
n(x) = m(x)(x) + r(x) (3)
where either r = 0 or deg(r(x)) < deg(m(x))
proof: Firstly, we show the existence of the polynomials (x
and r(x) satisfying 3 above, together with the requirement that
either r = 0 or deg(r(x)) < deg(m(x)) and then we establish
the uniqueness of these polynomials.If deg(m(x)) = 0, then
(x)=c is a non-zero constant in F and by the inverse property
of F , we have that:
n(x) = cc−1n(x) by the identity in F
.
c(c−1n(x)) + 0 by associativity in F
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such that m(x) = c−1n(x)) and r(x) = 0, satisfying (1). If
on the other hand the degree of m(x) ≥ 1, let Z denotes the
set of all polynomials of the form n(x) − m(x)(x), where
m(x)F , then the degrees of all polynomials in Zform a set of
non-negative integers and by the principle of the well ordering
of natural numbers, there exists a smallest element of Z, say
s. Let
r(x) = n(x)−m(x)α(x) (4)
Be such a polynomial of degree s in Z, then:
deg(r(x)) < deg(m(x)) (5)
for if we suppose for contradiction that deg(r(x)) >
def(m(x)), let deg(m(x)) = m and let
m(x) = amx
m + ...+ a0, am 6= 0
r(x) = bsx
s + ...+ b0, bs 6= 0
As F is a field, we have that amhasaninverseinF and so, let
r1(x) = r(x)− bsa−1xs−mm(x) ∈ Z
=bsxs + ...+ b0 − ([bsa−1xs−mm(x)]
=bsxs + ...+ b0 − bsa−1xs−m(amxm + ...+ a0)
=bsxs+ ...+ b0− [bsa−1xs−m× amxm+ ...+ bsa−1xs−m×
ama0]
=bsxs+...+b0−[bsxs+bsa−1xs−ma0. by the inverse property
of F . As
bsx
s − bsxs = 0, deg(r1(x) = r(x) − bsa−1xs−mm(x) <
deg(r(x)). This contradicts 4 which requires that r(x) is of
the least degree in Z and thus, validating 5 which validates
3 accordingly. To show that (x) and r(x) are unique in the
field F , let α1(x)andr1(x) be another pair of polynomials in
F satisfying 3, then we have that:
n(x) = m(x)α1(x) + r1(x) (6)
where either r = 0 or deg(r1(x)) < deg(m(x)). By the
inverse and identity property of the additive operator in F ,
we have that:
0 = n(x)− n(x)
⇒ 3− 6
= m(x)α(x) + r(x)− (m(x)α1(x) + r1(x))
⇒ (m(x)[α(x)− α1(x)] = r1x (7)
If α(x) − α1(x) 6= 0, then deg(m(x)[α(x)α1(x)]) <
deg(m(x)) and thus making 7 a contradiction of the require-
ments of (4), which require that deg(r1(x)) < deg(m(x)).
Hence,
α(x)− α1(x) = 0 (8)
Substituting 8 into 7 shows accordingly that
r1x− r(x) = 0 (9)
From 8 and 9, we have that α(x) = α1(x), r1x = r(x)
and thus, showing the uniqueness of α(x) and r(x) in F and
hence, 3.
Theorem 2: Let F be a field, and n(x) and m(x) be non-zero
polynomials in F , then n(x) and m(x) have a unique monic
greatest common divisor, say d(x) in F such that:
d(x) = α(x)n(x) + β(x)m(x) (10)
proof: Let d(x) = d0 + d1x + +dnxn , dn 6= 0 be a
polynomial greatest common divisor of n(x) and m(x) in
F . As a greatest common divisor is not unique, if dn 6= 1,
by the inverse property of F , there exists d−1n ∈ F such
that d−1n d(x) is also a greatest common divisor. Let d1(x) be
another monic greatest common divisor of n(x) and m(x) in
F , then d(x)|d1(x) and d1(x)|d(x).
⇒ ∃y(x), z(x) ∈ F : d1(x) = y(x)d(x) and d(x) = z(x)d1(x)
⇒ deg(d1(x)) ≥ deg(d(x)) and deg(d(x))≥ deg(d1(x))
⇒ deg(d1(x)) = deg((d(x))
⇒ deg(y(x)) = deg(z(x))
This implies that y(x) and z(x) are constants in F and since
d(x) and d1(x) are monic polynomials, then y(x)=z(x) =
1, and d1(x) = d(x). Therefore, the monic greatest common
divisor d(x), of n(x) and m(x) in F is unique and hence,
Theorem 2.
Theorem 3: Let F = GF (28) = GF (Pn) be a field, then
there exists an irreducible polynomial of degree n over Zp
proof: As F is a field, let g be a generator element in F .
Also, let p(x) be a minimal polynomial of degree n in F . By
the property of the generator element g, we have that every
element in F occurs as a power of g and as such, the minimal
polynomial p(x) = pg(x). Let
(deg(pg(x))) (11)
By Theorem 1, there exists polynomials say n(x)), r(x)) ∈ F
such that for any constant c, xc = nc(x)pg(x) + rc(x)
with either rc(x) = 0 or deg(nc(x)) < deg(pg(x)) = m.
Substituting g, gc = nc(g)pg(g) + rc(g) and as pg(x) is a
minimal polynomial, we have gc =c (g).0 + rc(g)
⇒ gc = rc(g). But as g is a generator element in
F = GF (pn), we have that gp−1 = 1 and as such, the highest
number of the distinct powers of g is pn − 1 and by 11, we
have that the highest number of the distinct powers of the
generator g = pm − 1, which implies that n ≤ m. Also, as
pg(x) is a minimal polynomial in F , for any two polynomials
say j(x) and z(x) in F , j(g) = z(g).
⇒ j(g) - z(g) = 0
⇒ j(x) - z(x) = 0
Since deg(j(x)− z(x)) < deg(pg(x)), then the number of
elements in F = GF (pn) is at least as big as the number
of polynomials in F with degree less than m. This implies
that m ≤ n. Whereas, m ≤ nand n ≤ m implies that m =
n. Therefore, deg(pg(x)) = n and since pg(x) is a minimal
polynomial, pg(x) is then an irreducible polynomial in F =
GF (pn).
